Circulating Interest-Bearing Currency: An Arkansan Experiment, 1861-1863 by Richard C.K. Burdekin & Marc D. Weidenmier
Putting Legal Restrictions Theory to the Test: An Arkansan Experiment, 1861-1863 
 
 
Richard C. K. Burdekin and Marc D. Weidenmier
* 
 











During the Civil War the Arkansas legislature funded their expenditures primarily through  
interest-bearing warrants and war bonds.  After these issues were made legal tender in November 1861, 
the discount attributed to them disappeared immediately and they began to circulate widely.  By mid-
1862 they appeared to be preferred to Confederate notes – which were also made legal tender in 
November 1861 but required military intervention to support their acceptance.  The widespread 
circulation and potential dominance of legal tender interest-bearing currency is consistent with legal 
restrictions theory.  Confederate notes supplanted the Arkansas issues only after the legislature suspended 
interest payments in November 1862. 
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Putting Legal Restrictions Theory to the Test: An Arkansan Experiment, 1861-1863 
  
 
[W]e the Home Guard, ... having heard of the attempt to depreciate the war bonds by 
some merchants and dealers, and believing it to be for the interest of those families ... 
who are compelled to use them, ... [resolve] [t]hat we will not trade with or patronize any 
merchant or dealer who refuses to take the war bonds at par. 
 
(Arkansas True Democrat, December 3, 1861) – emphasis in original     
  
 
Interest-bearing currency is a rarity.  Legal restrictions theory suggests that the dominance of 
non-interest-bearing currency is possible only because of legal impediments that prevent banks or other 
institutions from offering interest-bearing alternatives (Wallace, 1983).
1   One argument against this 
approach is that even in a case like pre-1844 Scotland, where banks were not prevented from paying 
interest on their notes, interest-bearing notes as such were still not offered (White, 1987; Cowen and 
Kroszner, 1989).
  Even though interest-bearing notes were issued by both Northern and Southern 
governments during the Civil War, neither government granted them legal tender status and it is unclear 
how widely they circulated (Gherity, 1993; Makinen and Woodward, 1999).  In the case of the South, 
their failure to chase non-interest-bearing notes from circulation may actually be explicable in terms of 
government-imposed restrictions on banks, however (Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2002). 
A dilemma recognized by proponents and opponents of legal restrictions theory alike is that the 
interest-bearing medium must be small enough for transactions purposes and yet be large enough to make 
interest calculations and interest payments feasible and cost effective (White, 1987).  The South’s 
interest-bearing notes were most commonly of $100 denomination, for example, making them too large to 
be conveniently used in day-to-day transactions at first -- although as the war progressed this became 
increasingly less of an issue owing to rapid inflation.  One example of a government issuing small-
denomination interest-bearing debt is found in post-World War I France.  As with the Confederate 
currency, the interest-bearing securities clearly did not chase non-interest-bearing currency out of 
circulation.  Although at least one department store advertized that they would accept the interest-bearing  
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bills, Makinen and Woodward (1986) also cite a first-hand account of their not being readily accepted for 
transactions purposes.  While the question of their actual circulation remains unclear, it is significant that 
these bills were never made legal tender.  Thus, they were never put on a level playing field with 
conventional legal tender non-interest-bearing notes. 
 There is, however, at least one documented instance where the authorities explicitly conferred 
legal tender status on interest-bearing securities.  In November 1861 the Arkansas state legislature made 
their interest-bearing war bonds and treasury warrants legal tender instruments receivable both for taxes 
and in payment of other debts.
2  This accorded them the same legal status as Confederate notes.  The 
legislature also approved the issuance of small denomination bills and scrapped the prior $5 minimum.  
At that point, the discount previously attached to Arkansas’ interest-bearing securities disappeared and 
there is abundant evidence that the notes began to circulate widely.  Moreover, the interest-bearing notes 
appear to have been preferred to non-interest-bearing Confederate notes.  Even though Confederate 
currency was also made legal tender in Arkansas under the same November 1861 Act, the Confederate 
commander in Little Rock felt compelled to issue repeated orders outlawing discrimination against 
Confederate money.  It was only after interest payments on the Arkansas securities were suspended in 
November 1862 that Confederate notes clearly supplanted the state issues and become the main 
circulating medium within Arkansas.  The bonds and warrants’ rise to dominance after being made legal 
tender and their disappearance after interest payments were suspended seems quite explicable in terms of 
legal restrictions theory but very hard to explain otherwise. 
 
1.  THE ARKANSAN EXPERIMENT 
The first $2,000,000 issue of 8 percent war bonds with values ranging from $5 to $500 
was authorized by the Arkansas Secession Convention on May 11, 1861.  Additional issues of 8 
percent warrants were also authorized as needed by the state treasurer and these warrants were 
receivable in payment for state debts.  Use of warrants and bonds was limited to only two-thirds  
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of any tax on June 1, 1861 -- with the remainder to be paid in coin or overdue coupons -- and the 
denominations of the warrants were fixed at $5 and above.  Morgan (1985, p. 71) states that 
“Arkansas treasury warrants did not circulate well at first.”  But on November 18, 1861 the 
legislature passed a new law whereby any creditor refusing to accept either Arkansas treasury 
warrants/war bonds or Confederate Treasury notes and bonds for payment due would have no 
further recourse until two years after the end of the war.  At the same time the $5 minimum 
denomination for the warrants was removed along with the old requirement that one-third of 
taxes be paid in coin or overdue coupons.  The Arkansas True Democrat (January 23, 1862) 
gives the denominations of the new issues of warrants at $1, $3, $5 and $10 and apprehended 
that “they will come into general circulation and take the place of war bonds.”  As of September 
1862, the assistant state treasurer reported that a total of $1,447,026.6 in bonds and $710,288.1 
in warrants had actually been issued (Arkansas True Democrat, September 16, 1862).  Most of 
these appear to have been small denomination issues of less than $5 (see Pecquet, 1986, p. 107). 
There seems to be no doubt that the state bonds and warrants circulated and were used as 
hand-to-hand currency after the November 1861 law was passed.  In the same month Governor 
Henry M. Rector (as quoted in the Arkansas True Democrat, November 7, 1861) summarized the 
prevailing situation as follows: 
The scarcity of money among the people renders it indispensable that some sort of 
circulating medium be provided by the state.  We are without banks, – ports 
blockaded – commerce stopped – the precious metals sunk, deep in the vaults of 
avarice; some sort of paper money must be temporarily supplied, to meet the daily 
accruing necessities of the people.  The war bonds, to be sure, from motives of  
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speculation, are depreciated now.  But ... land sales, and collection of the revenue, 
will absorb them in twelve months.  The first of January next will see them at a 
premium. 
Interestingly, the governor did not even mention Confederate treasury notes as an alternative 
circulating medium for the people of Arkansas.  Available data on the trading of Arkansas debt 
in Memphis, Tennessee shows an abrupt jump from a 15 percent discount to a 2 percent discount 
on December 1, 1862 following the passage of the new law (see Table 1).  Given the discount 
typically attached to out-of-state notes (Gorton, 1996) this suggests a very small (or non-
existent) discount within Arkansas.  Indeed, on December 14 the Arkansas State Gazette, one of 
Little Rock’s two major newspapers, explicitly stated that they placed Arkansas paper “on a 
footing with the best of paper money” (albeit at a 25% discount to specie). The Arkansas debt 
maintained its higher price until quotes end in February 1862 in advance of Memphis’ fall to 
Union forces later in the year.
3 
Following the passage of the November 1861 law, the Arkansas war bonds’ role as hand-
to-hand currency was noted by the state treasurer’s office (Arkansas True Democrat, January 9, 
1862): 
A practice has grown up, in various parts of the State, of cutting off the coupons 
and using them as currency.  These detached coupons will not be paid by the 
Treasurer until the bond from which they are cut is shown to him to be yet 
outstanding ...  
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The following response to the state treasurer’s notice seen in the Washington Telegraph (January 
15, 1862) yields further evidence of the importance attached to the war bonds and warrants as 
hand-to-hand currency: 
[T]he decision of the Treasurer tends ... to lessen the facility of circulation which 
it has been the policy of the State to create for these bonds to the utmost extent.  
No one takes these bonds as a permanent investment.  They are received and paid 
out like bank bills as currency ... 
 
The state government legislature had previously supported the circulation role of the bonds and 
warrants by outlawing the use of privately issued fractional currencies (or “shinplasters”) in the 
1861 legislation (Pecquet, 1989, p. 66).
4  The state’s November 1861 legal tender law and the tax 
receivability of the Arkansas securities did not, however, give any encouragement to the 
circulation of these instruments outside Arkansas’ borders.  The following newspaper 
announcement in the December 12, 1861 Arkansas True Democrat is indicative of the value 
attached to the state issues for use within Arkansas as well as their lack of acceptance outside the 
state: 
We have about three thousand dollars in Arkansas War Bonds, and Treasury 
notes, which we wish to exchange for Confederate, Louisiana, or Tennessee 
money.  The Arkansas money pays debts, taxes and purchases lands, besides, 
bearing interest at 8 per cent., and our only reason for wishing to make the 
exchange is that we cannot buy paper with it in other States. 
When the True Democrat newspaper raised its prices on January 30, 1862, its editor 
published the fact that payment could be made “in current paper, including Confederate notes, 
war bonds, and treasury warrants (see Dougan, 1969, p. 17).  Until publication was suspended in 
July 1863, the True Democrat enjoyed a circulation of 10,000 and, together with the Arkansas  
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State Gazette, represented the major Little Rock press.   Elsewhere Captain S. B. Poe, chair of 
the Merry Green Home Guard in Salinas County, Arkansas, points to Arkansas state warrants not 
only circulating but being the key transactions medium for the families living in his area of 
jurisdiction (Arkansas True Democrat, December 3, 1861).  A January 7, 1862 diary entry by 
John W. Brown, a Camden, Ark., lawyer and businessman (who later became a funding agent for 
the Treasurer of the Trans-Mississippi Department of the Confederate Army in June 1864), 
seems to confirm this predominance of the state currency in the aftermath of the November 1861 
law: 
Everything in the shape of money is disappearing.  Gold 35 to 40 percent over the 
best currency, even the N. Orleans banks and Government Treasury notes.  This 
state of things cannot last.  The War Bonds of Arkansas as they are called is 
almost the only circulation.” (Brown, 1852-1865, p. 212)   
By mid-1862 the continued use of the Arkansas bonds and warrants seems to be 
accompanied by a reluctance to accept Confederate notes.
5  The case of the Pike County cotton 
factory is described in the Washington Telegraph (June 4, 1862): 
Mr. Merrill receives ... $1.50 in specie, in lieu of $2.50 Confederate money, when 
offered.  We must be consistent and acknowledge that to be wrong and 
indefensible.  No man should directly or indirectly discount the money of the 
Confederacy, who does not intend sometime to leave it.  Still the fair prices are 
payable in our ordinary currency, and he is no more reprehensible than the broker 
who buys Confederate notes at a discount.  
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Disdain for Confederate currency certainly does not seem to have been confined to Mr. Merrill.  
In his first official report after taking command of the Trans-Mississippi District, General 
Hindman states that in the period following the March 1862 Battle of Elkhorn “Confederate 
money was openly refused or so depreciated as to be nearly worthless” (United States War 
Department (comp.), 1885, p. 30).  Under his June 2 proclamation, General Hindman found it 
necessary to mandate that all persons within the district “take Confederate notes as currency at 
par, in all business transactions” (Arkansas State Gazette, June 7, 1862).  On June 10 martial law 
was declared in Pulaski County around Little Rock, with maximum prices imposed for goods 
and merchants ordered to keep their stores open every day except Sunday to accept payment in 
Confederate money (see Neal and Kremm, 1993, p. 121).  Hindman’s ardent support for the 
Confederate currency was reiterated and amplified in his General Orders No. 9, issued on August 
9, 1862, and reprinted in the August 30 issue of the Arkansas State Gazette (emphasis in 
original): 
 Confederate money is considered as of equal value with any other, and shall 
therefore be taken in all business transactions, and in payment of all debts of 
whatever kind or character.  Persons refusing so to take it, subject themselves to 
the penalties heretofore prescribed in orders. 
The state government had itself sought to use an additional issue of treasury warrants to 
pay the new Confederate government war tax that was due by May 1, 1862.  Although the 
Confederate government officially rejected this offer, it does not seem that Governor Rector 
really was then forced to sell the $650,000 in warrants that had been appropriated by the 
legislature on March 22, 1862 for the war tax payments (Morgan, 1985, p. 72).  General 
Hindman reports that he accepted over $400,000 in payment of war taxes, disbursing the funds 
within the state (United States War Department (comp.), 1885, p. 38).  Although Hindman does 
not explicitly state in which form payment was received, Ball (1991, p. 224) concludes that the 
treasurer “illegally paid [with] $400,000 of these warrants ...”  From this point on the state did, 
however, turn increasingly towards Confederate currency and Morgan (1985, p. 72) argues that,  
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as the state’s needs mounted, the “interest-bearing warrants became less and less attractive to 
state officials.” 
 
2.  WITHDRAWAL OF THE INTEREST-BEARING CURRENCY AND THE 
AFTERMATH 
In November 1862 it was proposed that “all interest bearing paper be withdrawn from 
circulation and scrip or treasury warrants without interest issued instead” (Washington 
Telegraph, November 26, 1862).  Interest payments on the warrants were formally canceled on 
November 21, 1862 and all tax collections were suspended on December 1, 1862.  After interest 
payments had already been canceled, a supplementary act passed on December 1, 1862 allowed 
for the provision of warrants of less than $1 in denomination (Washington Telegraph, January 
21, 1863).  Huff (1964, p. 245) states that by this time people lacked confidence in both 
Arkansas war bonds and Confederate notes.  Whereas the reluctance of the Pike County cotton 
factory to take Confederate notes earlier in the year had led to incensed citizens talking of 
“taking forcible possession of his factory and using it for the benefit of the community” 
(Washington Telegraph, June 4, 1862),
6  a December 29, 1862 diary entry by Brown (1852-
1865, p. 235) notes that  a “sum of $200 in gold could be bought for $500 in Confederate 
currency.”
7 
By the end of 1863 the “overextension of state debt and the loss of much territory made 
the state warrants and war bonds unpopular even in the Confederate-held portion of the state” 
(Pecquet, 1989, p. 70).  Indeed, the state’s financial system essentially disintegrated in the face 
of Northern invasion that culminated in the loss of Little Rock, the state capital, in September 
1863 and the retreat of Confederate forces to the far southern portion of the state south of  
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Camden.  The outstanding interest-bearing warrants were belatedly funded through issues of new 
non-interest-bearing bills that were authorized on October 1, 1864 to cover the principal and 
accumulated interest on those warrants that had been deposited with the state treasurer (Morgan, 
1985, p. 72).
8  Meanwhile, the dire situation in 1863 was summarized in a March 18 letter from 
the Confederate Secretary of War: 
The army is stated to have dwindled by desertion, sickness, and death from 
40,000 or 50,000 men to some 15,000 or 18,000, who are disaffected and 
helpless, and are threatened with positive starvation from deficiency of mere 
necessities.  The people are represented as in a state of consternation, multitudes 
suffering for means of subsistence, and yet exposed from gangs of lawless 
marauders and deserters to being plundered of the little they have.
9 
 
Eventually people were accepting Confederate treasury notes only because they “were forced to 
do so by military edict” (Huff, 1964, p. 253) and “shrewd operators got rid of it by buying up 
land, either from public authorities – who had to accept the currency at face value – or from 
others who needed the money to survive” (Moneyhon, 1994, p. 120). 
The demise of the Arkansas warrants preceded the military collapse, however, and seems 
to coincide with the suspension of their interest payments in late 1862.  In this respect some 
parallels may be drawn with the Civil War experience in Texas.  Under the terms of a pre-war 
February 14, 1860 law, Texas had a policy of paying interest on any of its warrants that could 
not immediately be redeemed.  On February 9, 1961 the legislature made these warrants 
receivable for taxes and other monies owed to the state (Morgan, 1985, p. 76).  The payment of 
interest on unpaid warrants was repealed on January 11, 1862, however.  Thereafter, as in 
Arkansas, state warrants were largely replaced by Confederate Treasury notes that, by 1863, 
“had become the main medium of exchange in Texas and the standard of value” (Morgan, 1985, 
p. 78).  It appears, therefore, that the interest payments were critical to the choice between state  
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warrants and Confederate notes as the preferred circulating medium.  Moreover, the movement 
away from the use of state warrants appears to have been maintained even as military setbacks 
made the survival of the Confederate government increasingly questionable. 
 
3.  CONCLUSIONS 
The Arkansas case strikingly demonstrates how circulation and demand for the interest-
bearing state issues was elevated immediately after they achieved full legal tender status.  There 
is no reasonable doubt that they functioned as hand-to-hand currency following the passage of 
the November 1861 Act.  And it may well be that the absence of similar legal tender provisions 
elsewhere helps explain why there is much less evidence that other interest-bearing instruments 
(both those of the Civil War era and otherwise) actually circulated.  Legal restrictions theory 
predicts, however, that legal tender interest-bearing currency should not only circulate but also 
actually chase non-interest-bearing notes from circulation.  The evidence on this second point is 
much less clear cut.  There is simply no consistent data on either how widely each currency was 
used or what premium may have been accorded to the Arkansas money.  But, coupled with 
anecdotal evidence suggesting a preference for the Arkansas issues, discrimination against 
Confederate notes seems the only plausible explanation for the attempted “support acts” by 
General Hindman in June-August 1862.  The fact that the Arkansas money lost its appeal after 
interest payments were abolished later in 1862 also appears to accord with the predictions of 
legal restrictions theory – only after this did the (rapidly depreciating) Confederate currency 
again become the main circulating medium in the state.  
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Footnotes 
*  The authors thank Michael Dougan, Greg Hess, Harold Mulherin, Gary Pecquet, Janet 
Smith, Jennifer Ward-Batts and Tom Willett for helpful advice and comments and are 
grateful to the Reference Department of the University Library of the University of 
Arkansas at Fayetteville for supplying us with material from their archives. 
1.  Although Wallace’s legal restrictions theory has also been embraced by advocates of 
separating the medium of exchange function of money from the unit of account function 
(see Cowen and Kroszner, 1987), we focus solely upon the scope for interest-bearing 
currency competing with conventional non-interest-bearing notes. 
2.  In a smaller-scale, even less documented, episode in what is now Oklahoma, the Choctaw 
Nation issued $25,000 in treasury warrants under an October 21, 1862 law that gave 
these warrants status as currency (Morgan, 1985, p. 98).  The warrants were issued in 
small denominations ranging from 50 cents to $5 and were issued without the names of 
the initial recipients appearing on them.  In line with the Arkansan experience, Morgan 
(1985, p. 98) argues that this made the warrants “readily transferrable and served to give 
them status as a circulating medium.”  The majority of these warrants is believed to have 
been issued in early 1863. 
3.  During this period Arkansas had no banks and relied upon Memphis, Tennessee, as its 
financial center.  That is why even Arkansas newspapers report only the Memphis 
quotes.  Interestingly, the Arkansas Daily State Journal reports the bond quotations as 
part of their “bank note list” alongside the notes issued by various banks both in and out 
of state and also Confederate Treasury notes.  The constancy of the quoted price against  
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Confederate currency is consistent with quotations for other state notes and bank notes 
over this same period -- but does not imply an absence of trading, with all of these notes 
fluctuating considerably against gold over this same interval.  In addition to the quoted 
value, holders of interest-bearing instruments like the Arkansas bonds and warrants were 
also customarily credited with accrued interest through the date of the transaction. 
4.  Although this law does not appear to have been enforced with any rigor, given that the 
notes of at least one of these issuers, the Washington Exchange company in the 
southwestern part of the state, remained in common use at late as the summer of 1863 
(see Pecquet, 1986, p. 106). 
5.  The appeal of the Arkansas issues may have been further enhanced when the legislature, 
during their March 17-22, 1862 session, “backed the bonds and treasury warrants with 
the public lands ...” (Thomas, 1926, p. 318). 
6.  Previously quoted by Dougan (1976, p. 107).  Similar complaints were apparently voiced 
in April 1863 against an Arkadelphia thread factory that required ten to twelve 
Confederate dollars for a block of thread that cost four dollars in specie (Arkadelphia 
War Times, April 29, 1863). 
7.  Union soldiers may well have added to the inflationary pressures by spending counterfeit 
Confederate currency within the state.  In December 1862 Union Colonel William Ward 
Orme stated that his soldiers used counterfeit Confederate currency that was printed in St. 
Louis and distributed to the soldiers free of charge.  This same colonel claimed that local 
Arkansans at that time still “preferred Confederate money to greenbacks” (Huff, 1964, p. 
254).  
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8.  Meanwhile, the value of Confederate currency west of the Mississippi was bolstered in 
1864 by the Confederate Currency Reform of February 17, 1864.  According to that act 
old Confederate notes were to be exchanged for new notes on a two for three basis.  
Difficulties in transporting the new notes across the enemy-occupied Mississippi led to 
currency shortages, and temporarily elevated specie values of notes, in the region (see 
Burdekin and Weidenmier, 2001). 
9.  Extract from a letter addressed to General Kirby Smith that is quoted in Snead (1887, pp. 
454-55).  
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Table 1: Arkansas War Bonds, October 1861-February 1862 
 
 
Date                        Price        Date      Price 
 
1861/10/31   85     1862/1/1   98 
1861/11/1   85     1862/1/3   98 
1861/11/2   85     1862/1/4   98 
1861/11/8   85     1862/1/5   98 
1861/11/9   85     1862/1/6   98 
1861/11/12   85     1862/1/8   98 
1861/11/13   85     1862/1/9   98 
1861/11/14   85     1862/1/10   98 
1861/11/15   85     1862/1/11   98 
1861/11/16   85     1862/1/12   98 
1861/11/17   85     1862/1/14   98 
1861/11/19   85     1862/1/15   98 
1861/11/20   85     1862/1/16   98 
1861/11/21   85     1862/1/17   98 
1861/11/24   85     1862/1/18   98 
1861/11/26   85     1862/1/22   98 
1861/11/27   85     1862/1/23   98 
1861/11/28   85     1862/1/24   98 
1861/11/29   85     1862/1/25   98 
1861/11/30   85     1862/1/26   98 
1861/12/1   98     1862/1/28   98 
1861/12/7   98     1862/1/29   98 
1861/12/8   98     1862/1/30   98 
1861/12/10   98     1862/1/31   98 
1861/12/11   98     1862/2/1   98 
1861/12/12   98 
1861/12/13   98 
1861/12/14   98 
1861/12/15   98 
1861/12/17   98 
1861/12/18   98 
1861/12/19   98 
1861/12/20   98 
1861/12/21   98        
1861/12/22   98 
1861/12/24   98 
1861/12/25   98 
1861/12/27   98 
1861/12/28   98        
1861/12/31   98 
 
 
Source: Daily State Journal (Little Rock, Ark.) -- quotes are “as reported by the Memphis 
bankers” and do not appear to include accrued interest. 